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ABSTRACT
Political decentralization in a unitary state means 
devolution of the center's power to localities and/or 
periphery. Since such decentralization involves promotion 
of alternative power bases, it goes against the nature of 
the unitary state. Therefore, in a unitary state, where 
the authority is distributed from the center, the center 
should have confidence to whom it is decentralizing. 
Such trust/ confidence is, in turn, linked to degree of 
political integration, as measured by the 
'decentralisers' (i.e. the center). In the Ottoman- 
Turkish polity, the way of political integration was a 
'centralized' one, and it was not conducive to 
decentralization. Indeed, the centralization of the 
system began with attempts to forge a nation. The center 
was suspect of periphery. In such a context, the Turkish 
political culture lacked local 'government' tradition. 
The un(der)development of civic community hindered 
political decentralization. There are, of course, other 
factors influencing the degree of decentralization, such 
as the size of the country in question. But, the 
political culture and the degree of political integration 
(as a determinant of the degree of confidence) are
considered to be the most important in the Turkish case. 
This is because, other factors are, actually, encouraging 
for more decentralization. The debates around the issue 
are part of the broader debates over restructuring 
Turkish politics. As far as decentralization is 
concerned, the key question is, whether Turkey completed 
its integration and/or if the way of integration was/is 
correct? Opponents and proponents of decentralization are 
divided over this question(s). Arguments against 
decentralization seems to be based on the assumption 
that, decentralization as proposed by the proponents, 
would lead to a wholesale transformation of the 
principles of the Republic.
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ÖZET
Uniter bir devlette politik desentralisasyon merkezin 
politik gucunu yerel birimlere ve/veya 'çevreye' 
devretmesi demektir. Böyle bir desentralisasyon 
alternatif (politik) guc merkezleri oluşturacağı için 
uniter devletin doğasına aykırıdır. Bu nedenle, 
otoritenin merkezden dağıldığı uniter bir devlette, 
merkezin otoritesini dagîttîklarîna güvenmesi gerekir. Bu 
güven de politik entegrasyonun, merkez tarafından 
olculmus, derecesine bağlıdır. Osmanlî-Turk siyasetinde 
politik entegrasyon 'merkezi' bir yolla sağlanmaya 
calîsîldi, buda desentralisasyon için 'olumlu' bir 
gelişme değildi. Aslında, OsmanlI'nın modern anlamda 
merkezileşmesi yeni bir entegrasyon (ulus-devlet) 
denemeleriyle aynî zamana 'tesadüf ediyor. Merkez 
çevreden kuşku duyuyordu. Böyle bir durumda, Türk politik 
kulturu yerel hükümet geleneğinden yoksun kaldı. Politik 
desentralisasyonu etkileyen, ülkenin coğrafi buyuklugu 
gibi, başka faktörlerde var. Fakat, Türkiye örneğinde 
politik kültür ve 'güvenin' derecesini belirleyen olarak 
poitik entegrasyon derecesi en önemli faktörler olarak 
algılandı. Çunku, diğer faktörler desentralisasyonu
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gerektirirken, Türkiye merkeziliğini bugune dek 
korumuştur. Konu üzerindeki tartışmalar aslinda Türk 
politikasinin yeniden yapilandirilmasi tartîsmalarînîn 
bir parçası. Desentralisazyonu tartışanlar, Türkiye'nin 
politik entegrasyonun tamamlanıp tamamlanmadığı sorusunda 
ve entegrasyonun seklinin doğru olup olmadığı konusunda 
bölünmektedir. Desentralizasyona karsı çıkanlar 
Cumhuriyetin temellerinin sarsılacağına inanarak 
savlarını oluşturmaktadır.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two years debates over the structure of the 
Turkish government has gained momentum and became one of 
the popular issues of the media. It is suggested that the 
present 'centralized' government structure is no longer 
effective and efficient in delivering services and in 
carrying out its responsibilities, because it is the same 
structure of government that was built in the early years 
of the Republic But, a lot has changed since then, the 
size of the population, the composition of the population 
(i.e. urban-rural division) and so on. Therefore, it is 
argued that it is almost impossible for central 
government to meet with these 'diverse' demands/needs. 
Also, it has been argued that local governments are 
unable to meet the growing needs/demands of the local 
population, since they do not have legal, financial, and 
administrative means to do so. Not only the
administrative concerns but also concerns for further 
democracy has paved the way towards making restructuring
an issue. This is because, it is believed that local 
governments are more democratic since they allow 
participation of people, and since governors become 
accountable to electorate rather than to the center. The 
programme of the first True Path Party and Social 
Democratic Peoples Party coalition government (led by 
Demirel and Inonu), which states that a restructuring of 
government is needed and this will be done by 
'withdrawing' the center from the localities illustrates 
the point reached in Turkey. The programme proposed that 
in the central-local administration dichotomy, the latter 
will be emphasized by increasing the authorities of the 
Province General Councils and Municipality councils.^
It can be suggested that there is a general trend 
favouring the reduction of the central state. It can be 
related to monetarist ideology, but also to what 
Huntington calls, the 'Third Wave' of democracy. In the 
Turkish case, debates over decentralization takes place 
in broader debates over restructuring of Turkish 
politics. It has been argued that politics in Turkey lags 
behind the changes in the society, and therefore, Hikmet 
Özdemir suggests, that it has been 'decaying'.^ Thus,
some reform in Turkish politics is needed. 
Decentralization is a part of these debated reforms, 
another, for example, is the presidency debates. 
Decentralization debates are also part of the Second 
Republic debates.^ In order to explore what has really 
been debated by the commentators, it is essential to set 
a theoratical framework.
There are three types of decentralization; 
déconcentration, delegation, and devolution. But, not all 
of them implies political decentralization. 
Decentralization is a question of degree, and totally 
(de)centralized structures are abstractions. In the above 
typology, the degree of decentralization increases from 
déconcentration to devolution, hence, devolution is the 
most decentralizing one. Déconcentration can be defined 
as passing some authority or responsibility to a lower 
level within the central government machinery, normally 
under closer supervision of the central government. 
Delegation is transfer of some responsibility for 
specific functions to the agents that are outside of the 
central bureaucratic structure. Devolution is creation of 
sub-national units of government which are financially
and legally more powerful regarding the activities which 
are outside the direct control of central government.' 
Only devolution implies promotion of alternative centers 
of power and decentralization of decision making 
authority. Therefore, only devolution implies 
political decentralization which is of concern here.
In all structures of government, authority is distributed 
to various institutions and levels. This distribution can 
be construed in two ways, according to who has the 
authority and where the authority is located in a 
geographical sense. ^ It is the latter kind of 
distribution that refers to the extent and manner of 
decentralization to different sub-national governments 
which is of concern here. Whether it is a federal or 
unitary state, political centralization refers to a 
concentration of decision-making authority in the central 
(or national) government but not necessarily 
administrative implementation of decisions. Political 
decentralization, on the other hand, implies that sub­
national units of government have discretion available to 
them to engage in effective decision making regarding 
policies affecting their area and discretion about how to
implement and interpret central decisions. In other 
words, political decentralization refers to the dispersal 
of political decision-making with respect to matters 
regarding policy issues, including which policy to be 
pursued, the amount of revenues to be raised and the 
allocation of available revenues. Administrative 
decentralization refers to dispersal of administrative 
discretion as opposed to discretion over the nature of 
policy.’
Political decentralization can be measured in several 
ways. The ideal measure for political decentralization 
would asses quantitatively the independent decision­
making powers of national, regional and local levels of 
government.** Functional responsibilities of national and 
sub-national governments, their financial independence, 
distribution of the public service employers are the 
tools used in measuring political decentralization. Among 
these tools the fiscal measures (resource capture) are 
the one most frequently used. By fiscal measures we mean 
the proportion of total government revenues and/or 
expenditures accounted for by central government. Keles 
suggests that.
'The most serious impediment to local autonomy 
is not administrative and political factors, 
but financial strains on local governments.... 
Financial dependence of the municipalities on 
central government forms a 'hidden mechanism' 
for their political control and administrative
supervision |9
However, if sufficient amount of resources provided, 
should we consider sub-national units as autonomous? Does 
it make local governments autonomous? Wolman notes the 
difficulty with associating availability of adequate 
resources with decentralization:
'the portion of direct expenditure for which 
subnational units are responsible may not be 
a valid measure ....because subnational units 
in some cases may simply be carrying out 
the political will of the national government, 
acting, in effect, as its administrative 
agents, rather than making independent 
decisions relating to policy and
resources. I 10
Perhaps, the important question is if the grants 
distributed conditionally? Centralization or 
decentralization can be defined in terms of legal 
arrangements between national and sub-national units. It 
is important to consider if the local governments have 
a chance to generate their own resources. If local 
governments are perceived as subordinate administrative 
units unable to raise their own revenues, it means that 
they are actually an extension of the center, hence, 
local administrations rather than local governments.“ 
Thus, when local governments' fiscal/financial activity 
is limited by impositions of central government, then it 
is less decentralized politically. But if they have the 
legal means to be able generate their own resources, 
then, they are more decentralized.
Federal structure tends to be more decentralized. 
However, if we take the share of central government from 
total tax receipts, a federal state like Australia can be 
more centralized than a unitary state like Sweden. In the 
former, the share of central government from total tax 
receipts was 80%, while in the latter it was 62%.'^
However, a simple measure of national as compared to sub­
national expenditures cannot yield much useful 
information on where political decision making occurs. As 
noted above, sub-national governments may make 
expenditures as a means of implementing central 
government policy. If sub-national governments cannot 
determine which service to provide, how to provide and 
when to provide, they become, in reality, administrative 
agencies of central government. Thus, division of tax 
revenue, proportions (between central and sub-national 
government) of expenditures are not adeguate measures in 
assessing the degree of political decentralization.
Also, reorganization into new-territorial units does not 
necessarily mean political decentralization. It can be 
administrative, if autonomy is not given to them.
In addition to degree of financial dependence (resource 
dependence) and degree of resource capture, the range and 
importance of functions performed by sub-national 
governments, and the autonomy given to sub-national units 
through legal relationship can be used for assessing the 
degree of political decentralization.
The functions of sub-national units and the degree of 
discretion that they have in carrying them out is the 
basic benchmark in assessing the degree of political 
decentralization. In federal structures sub-national 
units have a wide-range of functions, such as education 
and health. Normally, in a centralized state these 
functions are carried out by national government.
The second component, discretion, is defined by Page and 
Goldsmith;
'[discretion] refers to the ability of actors 
within local government to make decisions, 
within the formal statutory and administrative 
framework for local g o v e r n m e n t  s e r v i c e  
delivery, about the type and level of 
services they deliver, and about how that 
services are provided and financed''·^
Following from this point four major dimensions of 
discretion can be summed as: 1. Whether the services 
that local government provides are decided locally or 
whether they must be explicitly derived from a specific 
grant of powers.
2. The extent of legal or administrative 
constraints upon the local government concerning the 
type of services they provide.
3. The degree of dependence of local 
government to a central government as a major source of 
technical advise.
4. The financial discretion of local 
government, that is, whether the local government is 
able to raise its own revenues.
The level of economic wealth, size of the country, 
political culture, cultural and economic diversities are 
c o r r e l a t e s  of t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  in 
centralization/decentralization.The more developed a 
country, the more likeliness of decentralization. One 
reason for lack of decentralization in less developed 
countries is that central decision making ensures greater 
control over limited resources. Small size countries tend 
to be more centralized. Large size countries tend to be 
more decentralized since a large population concentrated 
in widely scattered areas is suitable for a federal form 
of government. Economically, in a larger and more 
populous country the localities are able to generate
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their own economies of scale. As far as the political 
culture is concerned, the mode of formation of the state 
(whether coercive or voluntaristic), the duration of the 
time over which state-building has taken place, the 
dominant ideology (pluralist ideology, for instance, 
fosters local autonomy) are influential factors. 
Furthermore, the degree of homogeneity of the population, 
in terms of language, religion, and race influences the 
level of decentralization. Lastly, federal government 
tends to be more decentralized.
Totally centralized or totally decentralized structures 
are abstractions. It is reasonable to suggest that a 
federal state generally illustrates the more 
decentralized one.
Yet, centralization/decentralization is not the 
appropriate criteria in defining federalism. Federalism 
is different from decentralization. Indeed, Elazar 
suggests non-centralization for federalism, because the 
term decentralization carries with it the implication of 
power being transferred from the center, which is not a 
feature of federal states. This is because there is a
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non-hierarchical relation between federal and regional 
states. In federalism, political system is organized on 
a territorial basis in which sovereignty is 
constitutionally divided between two units; a central 
government and regional governments. Political decision 
making takes place at these two different levels, and 
central unit can not take the authority of component 
units unless the component units surrender. Federalism 
gives recognition to several levels of legitimate 
authority and allegiance. Here, the distinction between 
the terms regional-level government and local government 
helps to clarify the difference between federalism and 
decentralization. A regional-level government differs 
from local government in that it involves more far 
reaching balance of power questions. A regional-level 
government may have wider powers of autonomy and 
legislative competence of their own. Local government, on 
the other hand, usually involves the running of services 
that is considered to be more suitable to operate locally 
within the guidelines determined by central 
government.'* It is, perhaps, best to call component 
units as states rather than governments, since they have 
functions hardly delegated to local governments in
12
states, such as education, police power, public 
order, civil and criminal law. Furthermore, component 
units have considerable amount of financial and legal 
discretion on which service to provide and how to provide 
it. Local government, in a federal state, takes place 
within the regional-level 'states' ( states, because they 
have the authority to make laws and to change laws 
unilaterally). In other words, there is devolution of 
functions, with considerable degree of fiscal and legal 
autonomy.
In a unitary state, on the other hand, power devolves 
from the center, and mostly for administrative concerns. 
In unitary states we are likely to see administrative 
decentralization, that is delegation or déconcentration, 
but not devolution which implies political 
decentralization. In a unitary state, political power is 
undivided, and is vested within the various organs of the 
central power. There is a unity of executive, judiciary 
and legislative powers at the center. If and when some 
sort of responsibility (and perhaps some authority with 
it) delegated to local level, it can be taken back 
easily. In unitary states, the powers to carry out the
13
policies that are decided by the center are delegated to 
localities (for administrative efficiency concerns). The 
authority of local governments (if any) in unitary states 
is restricted by centrally defined parameters. Unlike 
federalism, power is decentralized primarily to various 
forms of local government where the relationship is 
hierarchical. Thus, the authority of local governments 
can be taken easily.
A third type of state is an intermediate one between the 
truly federal and unitary states. This type is termed by 
Elazar as 'compound unitary s t a t e I n  this type of 
government, substantial rule making powers devolved to 
sub-national governments, and federal-like practices are 
adopted. In this type of government, regional governments 
have legislative powers and functional responsibilities 
that would normally be considered as the prerogative of 
central government. Spain and Belgium can be given as 
examples of this type.
Decentralization is used for various objectives such as 
nation building, local democracy, administrative 
efficiency, and so on. Objectives of decentralization can
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also act as a criteria by which it is possible to assess 
the implications of distributing authority to sub­
national governments. Paddison, for instance, suggests 
that decentralization can be used as a vehicle for 
reinforcing the unity of the state, but the existence of 
alternative power bases can be seen as a threat to a 
larger unit.’* Thus, political decentralization goes 
against the nature of unitary state.
Indeed, as Illy rightly puts it, the center feels 
reluctant to decentralize unless it has confidence in the 
people to whom it is decentralizing.” It was, perhaps, 
this lack of confidence which resulted in centralization 
rather than decentralization in the early years of 
nation-building in Turkey. The degree of confidence in 
periphery is, in turn, related to the degree of political 
integration. This is because loyalty to the center can be 
measured in its terms. The idea of political integration 
is tied to development of a cohesive political community, 
it can be better described as national integration or 
nation-state integration (i.e. achievement of a cohesive 
population, in cultural, economic and political terms) 
The equation of political integration with nation (or
15
national integration) is closely related with the concept 
of state. Baradat (1991) suggests the state is a 
political concept around which people unify themselves, 
it is through which people identify themselves. The 
individuals within the state are so closely bound 
together that they soon become a nation, if not 
already.^' Individuals can be 'nationalized' by the 
state, and the nationality can be defined in terms of 
citizenship of a state.
A nation may create a state, but a state may forge a 
nation.^^ In the Ottoman-Turkish case, attempts to forge 
a nation were made by the state, or more accurately by 
the elites of the state (i.e. the military and the 
bureaucrats). The Tanzimat period was an attempt to 
create an Ottoman nation through reforms introduced by 
the elites of the center. The measures for 
decentralization were redressed by other measures of 
centralization during the Tanzimat period. On the whole, 
the period was a centralized period for center hoped to 
maintain 'unity' of the 'Ottoman State' by extending 
itself to the periphery.
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The failure of Ottomanism (or Ottoman nation-state) can 
not solely be explained by the multi-ethnic structure of 
the Empire, because there are many examples of multi­
ethnic nation-states. According to Mardin, success of 
Europe in creating nation-states lies in its feudal past. 
This is because the feudal antecedents allowed them to 
have multiple confrontations between feudal nobility, 
cities, burghers and so on. The multiple confrontations, 
in turn, led to the well articulated structure of nation­
states.-^
The conflict in the Ottoman empire, on the other hand, 
was unidimensional, between the center and periphery. And 
the solutions to these conflicts were highly centralized. 
The centralized feature of Turkish polity continued in 
the period of the Republic as well. Indeed, until 
recently basic cleavage continued to be between center 
and periphery. Similarly, the central (top to down) 
social engineering feature of the Tanzimat period 
continued in the Republican era. It was res publica by 
military/bureaucratic elites of the center. This res 
publica was to forge a nation (or better, a nation­
state) . If decentralization is one of the vehicles of
17
building national unity in general, it is not one of the 
vehicles used in the particular Turkish case. In the 
Ottoinan-Turkish case, centralization, in the modern 
sense, occurred with Tanzimat reforms as the nation-state 
building attempts were unleashed. Forging a nation and 
centralization 'coincided'. This was, perhaps, because 
periphery perceived to be as disintegrating. It is one 
of the assumptions of this study that decentralization of 
authority is related to transition from res publica by 
the state elites to democracy.-“* This is because, elites 
of the center kept authority in the center to build a 
nation-state. Therefore, second assumption is that this 
transition, in turn was linked to the degree of political 
integration.
In Turkey decentralization is a delicate subject. This 
is, perhaps, because of the phrases in the 1982 
constitution about the indivisible integrity of the state 
with its nation and land. Also, in Turkey the notion of 
central government is generally used as a synonym of the 
state. Therefore, there is a general tendency to perceive 
state and local governments as two opponent u n i t s . I n  
such a case the delicacy of decentralization springs from
18
the fear of disintegration and/or 'division of 
integrity.' Furthermore, the fact that Turkey had no 
local government tradition is an unfavourable historical 
heritage for decentralization. It was only in 1913 that 
municipalities were recognized as corporate entities. 
One might easily get labelled as a traitor, when s/he 
suggests some decentralization. Indeed, when the previous 
President, Turgut Ozal, suggested that we should discuss 
federalism (regarding the Kurdish isssue), the then Prime 
Minister, Suleyman Demirel, declared that discussing 
federalism, is meaningless and associated with being a 
traitor.^* Similarly when the president applied to the 
court for prosecution of a True Path Party deputy, who 
allegedly insulted him, the court rejected his 
application and accused him of damaging our nationality.
There had been one major cleavage in the Ottoman-Turkish 
polity, it was the cleavage between center and periphery. 
However, in the post-1980 period Turkish jacobins were 
left out of the picture and the old center-periphery 
cleavage was replaced by state-civil society cleavage. 
Decentralization debates takes place between these 
groups. It is possible to observe a continuity, in change
19
from periphery to civil society, in that both of these 
groups have decentralist tendencies. The proponents of 
civil society include the neo-Ottomans and those 
favouring the so-called Second Republic. On the other 
side of the cleavage, there seems to be the ones who take 
Ataturkism as an ideology, and those who are left out of 
the picture. Originally Ataturkism was aiming at an 
instrumental polity, which emphasizes society rather than 
state.
In the following chapters, an attempt will be made to 
evaluate the debates between these groups. The following 
chapter gives a brief historical account of 
(de)centralization in the Ottoman-Turkish polity. The 
rationale for such review is that such account would help 
us to understand the political culture (as a determinant 
of the degree of decentralization) in Turkey. Then, the 
current debate will be reviewed. Finally, an attempt will 
be made to draw some conclusions from the current debate.
20
I. See 'Baykal: Türkiye Sadece Ankara’dan Yönetilemez *, and Ertugrul Ozkok,
'Baykal’dan Carpici iki Öneri’ both in Hürriyet, 28.9.1992.
2. Cumhuriyet, 20 November 1991, Ertugrul Ozkok, 'Ozal-Demirel Mutabakatinin
Maddeleri’, Hürriyet,12.11.1991, 'Yerel Parlementoyu Tartismaliyiz*, Hürriyete 
19.10.1992
3. Değişen Turkiyede Siyaset Paneli, Ocak 1993, Gazi Üniversitesi, Chaired by the 
previous President Turgut Ozal,
4. Mehmet ALTAN, Cumhurbaşkanı ve Yolsuzluk, Sabah, 25.4.1993, see also,
'2. Partide, 2. Cumhuriyet’, Cumhuriyet. 4.12.1992
5. Definitions draw from Hans F. Illy, ’Decentralization as a Tool for 
Development: Notes on the Current Debate’ in Dilemmas of Decentralization. M. 
Heper, ed., (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1986)
6. Ronan Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p.4-5, 38
7. Harold Wolman, ’Decentralization: What It Is and Why Should We Care?* in 
Decentralization. Local Governments, and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda. 
Robert J. Bennett, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). p.29
8. Paddison, The Fragmented State. 1983,p.38
9. Rusen Keles ’Municipal Finance in Turkey with Special Reference to IsLatuL* 
in M. Heper, ed., Dilemmas of Decentralization, p.54
10. Wolman, ’Decentralization: What Is It and Why Should We Care*, p.39
II. Metin Heper, ’Local Government in Turkey: An Overview with Special 
Reference to the Municipalities’, in Dilemmas of Decentralization. M.
Heper, ed., p.16
12. Arend Lijpart, Democracies: Patterns of Maioritarian and Consensus 
Government in Twenty-One Countries. (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1984).
13. Page and Goldsmith, ’Centralization and Decentralization: A Framework for 
Comparative Analysis’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy.
(1985), VOİ.3, p. 178
14. This paragraph draws from Paddison, The Fragmented State. 1983. pp.41-49.
15. Herbert, M. Levine, The Political Issues Debated: An Introduction to
Politics. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc, 1987), second edition, p.202
16. Paddison, The Fragmented State. 1983, p.l5
21
17.See Paddison, The Fragmented State, 1983, p.31
18. Paddison, The Fragmented State, 1983, p.50.
19. Illy, ’Decentralization as a Tool for Development..* in Dilemmas of 
Decentralization> p.ll5
20. Paddison, The Fragmented State, 1983, p.58
21. Leon P. Baradat, 'Political Ideologies: Origins and Impact’, (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall Inc, 1991), p.l2
22. Gordon Smith, ’A Future for Nation-State?* in The Nation-State: The
Formation of Modern Politics, Leonard Tivey, ed., (New York: St. i^fertin's
Press, 1981), p.l98
23.Serif Mardin,'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?, 
Deadalus, 101,2, Winter (1973): 169-190, p.l70
24. The term state elites refers to military and bureaucratic elites of the 
center. They are different from political elites.
25. Mustafa Gönül, 'Seçimli Valilik Üzerine Düşünceler', Amme idaresi 
Dergisi > 25, 3,(1992), p.63
26. Tempo, 3.11.1992, yil 4, şayi 45
27. Metin Heper, ’A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology and Normative
Ethics: ’Ataturkism’ in Turkey', Orient. 25 (1984): 83-94, p.84
28. ibid, p.85
22
CHAPTER ONE
AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
It was noted in the introductory chapter that political 
culture has an influence on the degree of
centralization/decentralization. Here, it is convenient 
to give a brief definition of political culture. 
Political culture consists of beliefs, symbols, and 
values that define the situations in which political 
action occurs.' It can better be referred as the 
orientations of all members of a political system to 
political action/political system. Cognitive orientations 
include knowledge and beliefs, affective orientations 
involve feelings, such as attachment or alienation, 
evaluative orientations comprise judgements and opinions 
about the system.^
Historical heritage of center and periphery relations
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(the major cleavage in the Ottoman Empire) is one of the 
determinants of political culture of decentralization. It 
is for this reason we now turn to give an account of the 
past.
The classical Ottoman Empire had not been a centralized 
state.As Mardin puts,
'the Ottomans dealt with the new social 
institutions they encountered [as the Empire 
expanded] by giving the seal of legitimacy to 
local usages and by enforcing a system of 
decentralized accommodation toward ethnic, 
religious and regional particularisms. No 
attempt was made for a more complete 
integration when loose ties proved 
workable....The center and periphery were 
two loosely related worlds·'’
The traditional system was called millet system, under 
which the distinction between different groups was not 
geographic, but sociological. The meaning of millet was 
a religious community, it was based on religious 
affiliation alone and included members of different
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ethnic groups and residents of widely separated regions 
of the Empire.In this system, the laws that govern one 
were those of one's millet.^
The governor-generals of provinces enjoyed a large degree 
of delegated military and financial authority. But this 
is not to say that provinces were self-governed, the 
governor-generals were subjects of the Sultan and they 
did not have autonomous political power.’ In the 
traditional Ottoman system, taxation and administration 
was not centralized but tightly controlled.* The 
traditional Ottoman system, Heper notes;
'was neither 'centralized' nor 'decentralized' 
feudalism. Instead it evidenced strong 
characteristics of patrimonialism. Whereas in 
both centralized and decentralized feudalism 
central authority is effectively checked by 
countervailing powers (of political and legal 
nature respectively) in patrimonialism the 
periphery is almost totally subdued by the 
center
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It was this lack of feudal antecedents that led to the 
ill-articulated Ottoman nation-state. The major (center 
and periphery) conflict in the Empire was never resolved 
by means of a compromise. The state was not consensual in 
the Ottoman system.
At the beginning of nineteenth century, the center was 
losing its control over provinces almost completely. 
After 1812, Mahmut II destroyed the delegated autonomy of 
avans in order to gain direct control of the center over 
the provinces. But, there was no fiscal/financial 
centralization in this period, provincial revenues were 
still farmed out by iltizam. Tanzimat reforms were a 
response to this loss of control of center. Therefore, it 
is difficult to talk of decentralization in this period 
(1839-1876). Tanzimat reforms were to extend center into 
periphery, to introduce a centralized administration. 
These modernization efforts were also efforts to 
'Ottomanise' the Empire. There was no concept of 
Ottomanism before nineteenth century. It was the Tanzimat 
reforms attempting to built an Ottoman nation-state. The 
political conception underlying the Tanzimat period has
26
a close affinity to the rationalist tradition of 
eighteenth century Western Europe.'” It was this 
rationalism which was in the origins of the notion of 
nation-state. This is because, rationalism created the 
idea of citizen (i.e. the individual who recognized the 
state as his/her legal home) , the idea of uniform law 
system throughout the country where all citizens have the 
same status, the idea of loyalty to a larger group than 
clan or caste, and the idea of the state that exist to 
serve those interests." The nation-state building 
efforts of Tanzimat reforms becomes more apparent when we 
consider the aim of the reforms. Heper notes that,
'The aim of the Tanzimat reforms was to 
establish a uniform and centralized 
administration linked directly with each 
citizen, and working with its rational 
principles of justice, applied equally 
to all''2
Tanzimat reforms represented a shift from the traditional 
millet system towards creating an Ottoman citizenship, 
and loyalty to Ottoman fatherland and to the ruling 
dynasty, irrespective of religion or origin.'^ It was
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Western type of nationalism -or more accurately, 
patriotism since the criteria in defining nations was the 
occupation of a common territory, defined by the 
jurisdiction of a common sovereign authority - which gave 
rise to the attempt to focus loyalty on an Ottoman 
fatherland, and vaguely defined Ottoman nation.''*
In this period tax collection was centralized through 
appointment of Muhassilis). A muhassil was a tax 
collector with a fixed salary, and was directly dependent 
on central government. What might be perceived as 
'decentralization' in this period was the creation of 
advisory councils at the Province and Kaza levels. 
However, the existence of councils does not represent a 
sign of decentralization by themselves. It is important 
to see its functions, membership composition, and the 
decision-making process.
The provincial councils were to be made of thirteen 
members, of which seven were central government 
officials. The remaining six were to be representing 
guilds and local notables. At the Kaza level there was to 
be five members, three of which were to be government
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of f icials. Thus, the center was dominant in the 
councils. In addition, candidates to be elected nominated 
by the center, and twice the number of representatives 
were elected, so that the center could choose between the 
elected representatives. Moreover, these councils were 
advisory, and they were actually established in order to 
improve tax collections.
The local governments were seen by Tanzimat reformers as 
administrative agencies of central government, thereby 
they were seen as a means of getting rid of 
intermediaries between center and its subjects.The 
reformers did not have 'decentralizing' objectives, such 
as local autonomy and local democracy. Rather, they 
wanted participation of local people to local 
administration for a better provincial government by the 
officials of the center.'^
Because the coordination was lacking, the reforms led to 
confusion and conflicts. Lewis suggests that anarchy and 
confusion was a result of the grave difficulties of 
centralization policy. Mithad Pasha was called to lead 
the discussions on revision of provisional reform. He
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declared that:
'the main difficulty in the provinces before 
the Tanzimat began had been the concentration 
of all administrative powers in the hands of 
the governors. The tanzimat tried to limit 
their powers and regulate the acts of all 
officials through supervision from Istanbul. 
But the Tanzimat leaders soon had discovered 
that central government could not handle 
provincial affairs efficiently and that 
centralization lead to confusion, delay and 
inefficiency '
However, the following measures were not decentralizing 
either. The Vilayet Law was, too, increasing the presence 
of the center in the periphery. The authority of the 
agent of central government, provincial governor, was 
increased; he had the power to convoke the councils and 
to dismiss them. The 1864 law remained in effect until 
1876. It was based on French system of administration. 
Old evalets were replaced by larger vilayets, and they 
were to be governed by vali. The vali was granted more 
discretion than his French counterpart orefet. But, the
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general tendency of law was towards centralization. It 
was multi-ethnic and multi-religious feature of the 
Empire which led to balancing any decentralizing measure 
with another centralizing one elsewhere in the law.*’
The centralizing tendency continued in the 1871 Idare-i 
Umumive-i Vilayet Nizamnamesi . which can be translated 
as the General Administration of Provinces Law. Both 
1864 and 1871 laws show little difference as far as the 
Vilayet Idare Meclisleri (Province Administration 
Chambers) were concerned. The Province Administration 
Chambers were executive bodies elected out of the 
Province General Councils. But, in the latter law, the 
number of bureaucrats in the Councils was increased, 
thereby the role of elected members were further 
reduced.
The starting point for Turkey's local government 
tradition was Vilayet Umumi Meclisleri (Province General 
Councils) . These councils were to be met once in a 
year for a maximum of forty days. These councils were 
hoped to be a channel for presenting wishes and the 
problems of local people to the governors. However, the
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dominance of the center continued here as well; agenda 
was set by the governors, and it was impossible for 
representatives to talk of other subjects than those 
indicated in the agenda.
The 1876 constitution affirmed the principle of 
decentralization, but the basic law was that of 1864 with 
minor subsequent amendments. The Tanzimat reforms 
represents attempts of a state to forge a nation. It is 
perhaps, because only the center was Ottoman, it tried to 
extend itself to periphery. Gokalp criticizes the 
Tanzimat reforms as follows,
'supporters of the Tanzimat reforms believed 
that it would be possible to create a nation 
based on will out of an existing 'nation' 
composed of several nationalities and 
religions
But, even Gokalp himself was initially an Ottomanist for 
he stated that 'we Turks are first Ottoman, then Turk, 
Arabs are Ottoman then Arab...'.^·^
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Ottomanism failed, partially, because of the persistence 
of religious allegiances as opposed to an allegiance to 
a common Ottoman fatherland. Although many statesman and 
officials of the Tanzimat reforms were sincere in their 
attempts to apply Ottomanism, a totally secular outlook 
has yet to be developed even among them, and religious 
allegiances were still too strong. In the local 
councils, the representation of non-muslim subjects was 
opposed by the muslim subjects, and the central 
government had to 'warn' the muslim subjects. It was with 
the help of vali that these councils were able to
'operate'. 25
A territorial and political nation proved to be difficult 
to achieve at a time of increasing nationalist movements 
in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire. 
Decentralization was considered as conducive to 
disintegration, because of the separatist nationalist 
movements.
When Ottomanism did not observe loyalty of non-muslim 
subjects, Sultan Abdulhamit responded with pan-Islamism. 
Pan-Islamism offered advantages to Abdulhamit;
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internally, the appeal to itiuslim loyalty could win 
support for his efforts to repress the opponents of his 
autocratic power, and externally, Islamic manipulation 
could create problems for imperial powers. He laid the 
emphasis on the Islamic feature of the state, and 
strengthened the institution and symbol of the 
c a l i p h a t e . Namık Kemal was aware of the difficulties 
with Ottomanism, and he, too, emphasised Islam as a 
unifying element. Instead of a nation based on 
territorial allegiance, Islamic brotherhood and 
allegiance to caliphate was his emphasis.^’ Abdulhamit's 
pan-Islamism was successful for a w h i l e , b u t  his 
success should not be exaggerated for at the turn of the 
nineteenth century Arab, Laz, Abhaza etc. were words that 
referred to the social reality of the Empire.^’
However, although there was an emphasis on Islam, the 
name of the unification was OsmanlI Indeed, there was 
a blurring distinction between Islamism, Ottomanism and 
Turkism. Lewis notes that;
'The Ottomans revealed that ..they were not 
prepared to concede real equality to non- 
muslims; the Turkists made it clear that the
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greater Turkish family was limited to those 
professing Islam.. To this extend both groups 
were Islamists, and Ottomanist leaders were 
indeed ready to make use both of Pan-Islamism 
and Pan-Turkism when they suited their ends'^*
The failure of both Ottomanism and Islamism, it might be 
suggested, was because of ethnic nationalism, which 
emphasised people rather than territory. This kind of 
nationalism was influenced by romanticism, and stressed 
the importance of common language and culture as a 
criteria in affiliation with a nation. Consequently, both 
Ottomanism (emphasised territory) and Islamism 
(emphasised religion) have failed.
The Turkism of the nineteenth century was romantic in 
nature as well. Turkism was another alternative for 
saving the Ottoman state. In 1862, Foreign Minister Ali 
Pasha emphasised the role of the Turks as the unifying 
element in the Empire. It was this observation of Ali 
Pasha which led Yusuf Akgura to offer his alternative 
pan-Turkism. Yet, he soon realized its practical
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political difficulties 32
It was the ethnicity-based separatist current that 
developed among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which 
made the Young Turks suspicious of decentralization. The 
Young Turks were dedicated to the idea of the union of 
the Ottoman Empire and Ottomanism. The basic concern of 
them was to save the state, that is the same concern with 
Alemdar Mustafa Pasha's and his Deed of Alliance's 
concern. The Ottomanist feature of Young Turks was 
illustrated in the 1890 programme of the Ottoman Society 
for Union and Progress. It stated that the party is 
composed of men and women who are all Ottomans.
The Young Turk era was a centralized one as well. In the 
Parliament and within the party, the opposition was 
overcome by the absolutism of the Committee for Union and 
Progress. Those who demanded decentralization were 
singled out and suspected, for decentralization perceived 
as dangerous, if not a suicidal formula.^" During their 
tenure, as part of the centralization pölicies, the 
number of 'elviye-i gayri mülhaka* type of lives, which
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were under the direct control of central government, 
were increased. However, the Committee for Union and 
Progress (CUP) was not united regarding policies about 
centralization.
In contrast to the centralizing policies of CUP, Prince 
Sebahattin was insisting on decentralization as the 
prescription to the ills of the Ottoman state. His 
prescription included provincial chambers that composed 
of ethnic groups of province in proportional numbers. 
These chambers were to have full power over legislation, 
order, and fiscal issues. He was also suggesting deputies 
to be elected from this chamber. Sebahattin's proposal 
was implying political decentralization for it gives 
provinces political authority to make laws, and allows 
them to generate their own resources. However, he 
eventually left the CUP and founded Tesebüsi Şahsi ve 
Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (The League of Private 
Initiation and Decentralization). Kutlay suggests that 
Sebahattin, too, was an Ottomanist for he wanted local 
government to be strengthened and re-ordered under the 
ideology of Ottomanism.^“* According to Aksin, what he was 
suggesting was even more than a federation, a
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confederation,·^* which implies a weak central government 
which is a creature of and subordinate to constituent 
groups, and can only work through constituent units. 
However, Sabahattin's ideas were not put into practice.
During the War of Independence center-periphery duality 
appears in the Grand National Assembly (GNA). The 
representatives of periphery were the so-called Second 
Group, and this group was demanding decentralization and 
political liberalism. The influence of the province 
residents in the making of this assembly was great. 
Therefore, it was the most representative Assembly. The 
1921 constitution was made by this assembly. In this 
constitution local government and self-government 
principles were weighted the most.^^ According to this 
constitution. Vilayets would divide into kazas, kazas 
into nahiyes. Vilayets were to have a corporate entity 
and full autonomy as far as local were matters concerned. 
Within the framework of laws set by the GNA, all matters 
of education, health, economy, agriculture, re-settlement 
and social services were to be arranged by Provincial 
Assemblies (Vilayet Meclisleri) . A body, called Idare 
Heyeti (Administration Group or Council) was to be
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elected out of the Assembly would carry out the executive 
functions. The governors would be appointed by the GNA, 
but they would interfere only when there was a clash 
between general duties of the state and the local duties.
Even today, local government as proposed in this 
constitution is not realized. The constitution was short­
lived and it was 'both functionally and ideologically 
undesirable to allow the development of strong local 
power centers' Also, this constitution was giving 
local governments a role and an authority beyond the 
historical development and tradition of local government 
in Turkey. Bearing in mind the inherited structure of 
state and society, it was almost impossible to see sudden 
realization of such decentralized system.'“
In fact, leaving political culture and the heritage of 
the past aside, the early years of the Republic had its 
own 'legitimate' reasons for centralization. The 
resources were restricted and had to be used in most 
efficient manner. There was a need for a nation-wide 
bureaucratic organization staffed by civil servants who
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shared the ideals of Atatürk. The country faced both 
internal and external threats, therefore the emphasis was 
on geographic and ethnic integration. The means of 
transportation and communication were not developed. 
All this provided the grounds for centralization.
The 1924 Constitution reaffirmed the principle of 
decentralization. However, although local government 
existed in theory, in practice there was no local 
government in Turkey, but local administration.'*^ The 
budget of the provinces was provided by the center and 
not by the local taxes. Thus, they were dependent on 
central government financially. Also, the functions of 
local 'governments' and how to provide them were 
determined by the center.
During the single party era prefets'*^ and the provincial 
chairmans of the Republican Peoples Party were same the 
persons. This laid the basis of partisanship of later 
years. The single party era was a centralized one, and 
the peripheral elites were barred from impinging affairs 
of the center which upheld the nation idea. The absence 
of any true local government reinforced the monopoly
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holding of the nation idea by the center.''·' The state 
was forging a nation, and decentralization in such a case 
considered to be dangerous. It was Ziya Gokalp who paved 
the way towards a view of Turkey as a nation, and he 
influenced the attempts in forging a nation. For him,
'nation is not a racial, ethnic, 
geographical, political or voluntary group 
or association, [but].. a group composed 
of men and women who have gone through the 
same education, who have received the same 
acquisitions in language, religion, 
morality, and aesthetics'.
A nation-state could be a 'homogenized product of various 
racial, ethnic, and religious elements', therefore 
education was an important element of forging the 
nation.''^ It was this, 'homogenization' effort of the 
center that prevented it from devolving and delegating 
its authority to localities. During this political 
integration process, periphery was considered to be 
'disintegrating' and 'undermining' national unity. 
Mardin notes that;
'between 1923 and 1946 the periphery -in
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the sense of provinces- was suspect, and 
because it was considered an area of 
political disaffection, the political 
center kept it under close observation '
This era was res publica from the center by the military 
and bureaucrat elites. But, it aimed a moderate 
instrumental rather than transcendental polity. 
Therefore, on the long run, the aim was to emphasize 
society (or periphery) (i.e .instrumentalism) rather than 
the state (center) Here, it should be noted that 
transcendentalism refers to the belief that man primarily 
belongs to a moral community, and it connotes a 'statist' 
orientation. In transcendentalism politics understood in 
terms of leadership and education. Instrumentalism, on 
the other hand, embodies the belief that man primarily 
belongs to an interest community, and it connotes a 
'societal' orientation. In this approach politics is 
understood in terms of adjustment of private pursuits and 
reconciliation of various interests."’ Such transition 
implied transition to democracy from res publica. 
Perhaps, this transition was to allow some
decentralization once the people were
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educated/homogenized enough to be a nation. In fact, it 
was the general process of democratization that began 
with the Green Revolution of the 1950s which led to the 
decentralization of local government in Turkey*®.
However, the centralized feature of local government in 
Turkey continued in the following decades. It is for this 
reason local 'government' in the post-1950 period would 
not be studied in detail. Their duties were defined and 
resources were given by the center. Local governments 
were unable to generate their own resources. The 
contribution of local governments' own resources to their 
budgets have always been smaller than the share received 
from national taxes. In other words, the major resource 
base has been the center. Moreover, the shares of local 
government within the national budget sums up to a small 
percentage. These shares were not distributed on a 
balanced fashion, but on a partisan basis. The increase 
in the numbers of municipalities led to further division 
of this inadequate source. Financial dependence of local 
governments is a hidden mechanism for their political 
control .*‘
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In the multi-party era, the 'centralized* tradition of 
Turkey made local governments a tool of irrational and 
partisan policies. As a result, there were pressures for 
devolution rather than delegation. The latter was the 
form of decentralization hitherto applied. In 1978, a 
Ministry of Local Governments was created, but the 
attempts were only able to survive until the September 
1980 coup.
The philosophy of the military government was to have a 
strong central government with an emphasis on 
déconcentration. The goals of the military reforms were 
two-fold; first was to solve urban problems, this was a 
new approach concerned with service delivery and finding 
and allocating resources to provide them, and the second 
was re-establishing the control of the center over 
municipalities of major centers. This was not only a 
product of the state tradition in Turkey, but also of the 
concern for national integrity/security The latter 
concern was perhaps because 'politicized' municipalities 
were considered to be distorting the political stability. 
In such a context, it is natural to see the attempts to 
close the fiscal gap, but not any devolution. Although
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the military government did not change the municipal 
revenue system radically, they made serious efforts to 
financially support local governments. Some improvements 
were made in the municipalities own revenue sources and 
the share of local governments from national taxes was 
increased.
1982 constitution, for the first time, provided that 
•special administrative arrangements may be made into law 
for the large settlements' (Act number 126). Some of the 
debates in recent years, as will be seen in the next 
chapter, are based on this act. On the basis of this act, 
the Motherland Government of 1983 tried to decentralize 
several functions, such as transfer of development 
planning to the newly created metropolitan local 
governments.
The local governments in Turkey, to this day, are 
administratively, politically and financially dependent 
on central government. They act as local administration 
agents of the central government.This is perhaps, because 
the attempt for decentralization, as Heper rightly puts;
•was always made to close the fiscal gap
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by increasing the revenues of local 
governments to a level that would match 
their responsibilities.
But as noted above in the introductory chapter, 
availability of resources does not mean 
'decentralization'. In the following chapter we will 
search for elements of political decentralization and 
devolution in the recent debates, especially in the 
debates after 1987.
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CHAPTER TWO
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
DECENTRALIZATION
In the relevant literature, advocates of decentralization 
associate it with better government. It has been argued 
that, decentralization will increase the administrative 
effectiveness and efficiency as well as responsiveness 
to local needs, and political responsiveness.’ It has, 
also, been argued that decentralizing authority to sub­
national units makes it more likely that policy outputs 
will more closely meet local needs, because national 
level administrators, politicians and civil servants 
tend to perceive the problems of state uniformly.^ But, 
each region/locality may have its distinct problems. 
Here, if efficiency can be termed as policy outcomes 
meeting with the local needs more closely, then 
decentralization, it has been argued, results in 
efficiency. This is because, decentralization can 
increase the knowledge of officials about the local
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problems, which in turn can lead to realistic and 
effective projects and programs.^ As Wolman notes, *if 
political decision-making is decentralized among 
subnational units, each unit can tailor its tax and 
service to the preferences of its citizenry'.“*
On the contrary, decentralization to large numbers of 
small units may inhibit achievement of optimal levels of 
efficiency by not permitting economies of scale in some 
service provision, such as education which generates cost 
and benefits across local and regional boundaries and 
requires national coordination.“’ In sum, smaller units 
encourage efficiency by bringing closer the ties between 
expenditure needs and revenue decisions, but economies of 
scale may be missed as a result of this.
On the political side of the issue, it has been argued 
that decentralization fosters responsiveness of policy­
makers to the will of the citizenry by placing government 
closer to the people. This is because, decentralization 
permits these decision-makers to be held accountable 
directly to the local citizenry and electorate. Thereby, 
decentralization promotes civic responsibility. Moreover,
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it has been argued that decentralization might allow 
greater representation for various political, religious 
and ethnic groups in decision-making.* Thus, it has been 
argued that decentralization allows government by people, 
and better democracy.
However, a positive correlation between decentralization 
and democracy, it has been argued, needs to be treated 
with caution, because local government may become 
dominated by the interests of an oligarchy and fail to 
represent community at large. Wolman notes,
'Politics in decentralized units of 
government may be more closed than 
national politics and more susceptible to 
domination by a small and unrepresentative 
faction or factions. Local politicians may 
be responsive to the local needs of their 
defined constitutiency (e.g. local 
business interests) rather than broader 
community. Accountability may be 
attenuated if local elections are not 
viewed as important and produce low 
turnouts (as in the USA) , or if local
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elections are contested on non-local 
issues or are seen essentially as 
referendums on the performance of the 
national government (as in U.K)
It has also been argued that, decentralization can reduce 
the perceived distance between citizens and their 
government, and can increase citizens' feelings of 
political efficacy.* It is said that higher levels of 
participation in local government can be obtained when 
decision-making devolves to local levels. Consequently, 
it is hoped that citizens will be anchored to the 
political system and democratic values will increase. All 
these, in turn, have a positive influence on securing 
political stability and increasing national unity.
However, decentralization may not necessarily increase 
the degree of participation. Empirically, in a 
decentralized polity such as USA, a low turn out rate in 
local elections might occur (around 30%) . On the other 
hand, the turn out rate could be much more higher in a 
relatively centralized polity, such as Italy (85%). ’
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It has been noted in the second chapter that, the present 
Turkish government structure is highly centralized, local 
governments' revenues are inadequate, and local 
governments are supervised by the center and they did not 
have any autonomy. In addition to these 'tangible facts', 
debates over decentralization take place in an 
'unfavourable' historical background. The Ottoman-Turkish 
polity had not experienced feudalism, but had a tradition 
of a centralized state and bureaucracy. Erguder adds, the 
elitism of Turkish politics which is closely associated 
with the Turkish bureaucratic tradition worked towards 
reinforcing centralization. Also there was an extreme 
polarization because power resources were concentrated in 
the center. This concentration of resources in the 
center, as noted above, also resulted in partizan 
attitudes in distributing revenues to local governments. 
The (partizan) distribution of resources helped to 
solidify the parties and their organizations. He also 
adds the fact that concepts like decentralization and 
performance of certain functions by autonomous or private 
institutions were not very popular within the
citizenry.'” This is perhaps related to the 'papa state' 
concept in Turkey." Indeed, as Heper notes, initiative
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for decentralization came not from the 'civic community' 
but from the political center, and responsibility to 
higher levels viewed as more important than political 
responsiveness to people.'^ In this context, 
decentralization is debated among, what might be referred 
as, intellectuals (i.e. journalists, top bureaucrats) and 
some of the politicians.
Debates over decentralization takes place against this 
background. There are a number of ways suggested for 
decentralization and strengthening local governments, 
such as election of prefets and creation of regional 
units, holding prefets accountable and responsible to 
local councils'·^, giving already existing units new 
functions, such as collecting taxes. An attempt will be 
made to understand and evaluate these arguments below.
In the post-1980 period, the first relevant appearance in 
the media was in late 1987. It was about creation of 
regional-level units (eyalet) covering a number of 
cities. The proposal was prepared by the Motherland Party 
(which was in office then) as part of the constitutional 
change proposal. First, the number of provinces was to
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increase, then they were to be combined under eyalets. 
According to sources, the number of eyalets varies from 
six to nineteen. If they were to be six, the regional 
centers would be Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Adana or 
Antalya, Samsun or Trabzon, Diyarbakır or Erzurum.'·* 
Another possibility is the old regional centers of the 
Ottoman Empire which are now in Turkey; provinces of 
Istanbul, Edirne, Bursa, Izmir, Elazig, Konya, Kastomonu, 
Ankara, Adana, Sivas, Erzurum, Trabzon, Van, Bitlis, and 
Diyarbakir.
According to this proposal, each region was to have a 
council able to take decisions regarding the matters of 
the region. This seems to represent a step forward for 
political decentralization. But, since we do not have 
adequate information about the functions, and the 
position of vali, the self-government aspect of the 
proposal remains ambiguous. However, the fact that the 
vali (prefet)'* will be appointed by the center and will 
be responsible directly to the president led some of the 
commentators to see the proposal as a step forward to 
presidency system based on unitary state.'’ Yet, the 
reported possibility of election of vali implies some
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sort of self-government and political decentralization.
It has been argued that, organization at the regional 
level is not unconstitutional, except for foreign 
relations, justice, and defence. And some of the 
proponents of the ’régionalisation' suggests that 
policies such as education and health would be made by
the center. 18
A similar alternative of what he calls 'Administrative 
Federalism' was suggested by Asaf Savas Akat (Professor 
of Political Science). He proposed division of Turkey 
into fourteen equally populated areas, excluding 
Istanbul. The sum of his proposal was 'a Turkey governed 
by localities'. The system suggested by him was similar 
to the German Lander system; each region would have 
elected Parliaments, Prime Ministers, and Governors.·’ 
Therefore, it can be suggested that his alternative goes 
beyond administrative federalism and implies political 
federalism.
Yet another alternative of bolge yönetimi (region(al)
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administration) created on the basis of already existing 
spontaneous economic centers was suggested by Necdet Ugur 
(formerly Minister of Education, and Interior). His 
alternative proposes regional level organization of local 
functions of ministries, cooperation among the regional 
units of different ministries.^® Thus, administrative 
rather than political decentralization based on the 
principle of delegation of center's authorities to the 
representatives of the center in the regions.
It is assumed by the proponents of decentralization that, 
regional level units would expand the democratic 
structure through its councils, and would help to 
overcome the problems encountered in central government. 
Pluralism and openness will erode the negatives of 
restricted democracy of a single central parliament. 
Spread of political decision-making powers would mean 
further democratization and a transparent administration. 
Moreover, the division of labor between the center and 
regions would mean reaching the outcomes fast, and 
reduction in the burden of the center. Furthermore, 
creation of political- administrative big industry and 
commerce centers will slowdown immigration to the west of
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Turkey. This is because, it is believed that regional 
centers will become attractive and stop the capital 
flight to the West. Also, it has been argued that the 
wish of civil servants to be appointed to the west will 
stop. Lastly, the sense of possession of government will
develop 21
As opposed to creation of larger units, another 
alternative suggests focusing on smaller ilce level. It 
proposes giving a corporate status to ilce, and creation 
of its councils. Organization at this level, it is 
suggested, will result in carrying out services 
effectively at a reduced cost, and easier control of 
them. Also, it is argued that, the race to become a 
province will stop.^^
According to Coşkun Kırca's (member of Parliament since 
1991, formerly Ambassador to UN) interpretation, the 
current constitution does not allow creation of political 
regional level units. According to Kirca, eyalet can only 
be seen as administrative units of the center, based on 
the principle of delegation. To carry this out, relevant 
acts of the constitution should be changed. This is
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because, the act 127 did not count eyalet among local 
administration units, and although the act 126 makes it 
possible to form an administrative unit covering more 
than one province, the aim of this is not the creation of 
another central administrative division, but to obtain 
productivity and coordination in carrying out public 
services. Further, he considers any administrative unit 
beyond the province level as a de facto step towards 
federalism, a system that could lead to separatism and 
challenges the 'indivisible integrity of the state with 
its nation and country'.” Kırca regards even 
administrative 'régionalisation' as going against the 
unitariness of the state, because he considers 
regionlisation a step towards 'regionalism'. According 
to Kirca, régionalisation is a kind of administration 
which proposes regional self government for effective 
defence of regions' own interests. Regionalism, in his 
definition, is the case in which the interests of a 
region is hold more important than the whole country's 
interests. He goes on, given that 'in our country 
regionalist feelings are quite strong even among the 
present provinces' (sic), decentralization to regional 
levels can be harmful for our national integrity. Kirca
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points out that, without consolidating our national 
integrity, especially as far as the language and culture 
concerned, local autonomy goes against the unitary 
structure. He adds the planning needs and the aim of 
preserving general economic balances as obstacles to 
autonomy. He also projects/suggests that, the actual aim 
of régionalisation is to shift the basis of the state 
from millet (nation) to ummet.^*
(Further elaboration of the last point will be made below 
in the paragraphs regarding Neo-Ottomans).
The régionalisation proposal of the Motherland Party, it 
is said, would have the prefets elected (they then would 
become 'governors') on the long run. Elected prefets 
were supported by some other commentators on the issue. 
It was seen not only as a solution to the Kurdish issue 
in the Eastern part of Turkey, but also as a means of 
strengthening local governments and removal of the 
tutelage of the center.
Mustafa Gonul (member of the Supreme Court) takes the 
lead in 'elected prefets' debates, but he also favours 
régionalisation. Politics, he argues, is the most
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effective and democratic means in realizing the 
objectives of local governments. Gonul states the 'wrong* 
with the system and the obstacle to local government: 
although the election process of the members of Province 
General Councils and Municipality Councils is political 
(for they are nominated by political parties as 
candidates) , these councils are barred from political 
discussions. Moreover, these councils are chaired by a 
centrally appointed governor, who has considerable degree 
of 'influence'. Therefore, solution to the problem is 
politicization of both councils and prefets ( i.e. 
election of prefets).
Election of prefets would politicize the institution of 
provincial governorship, but, Gonul argues, it is already 
politicized for a number of reasons. Firstly, the nature 
of the duties of prefets puts the prefet in such a 
process because, some of the decisions that they could 
make have considerable political implications. Indeed, 
prefets are not only administrative, but also political 
representatives of each minister in the cabinet. 
Secondly, reshuffling of the prefets with each change in 
the central government is a sign of politicization as
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well.
Election of prefets can be realized in two ways. First by 
changing the relevant acts of the constitution. Second, 
by changing the relevant law. Gonul suggests two possible 
alternatives for realization of the latter. In both ways 
the principle of the integrity of administration and 
local government would be maintained. The first 
alternative is to get an independent or party member 
candidate elected at the same time and for the same 
period with the Province General Councils. Alternatively, 
'local parliaments' can nominate a number of candidates, 
one of which to be appointed by the center as 'governor'. 
It should be noted here that, it seems like local 
parliament in Gonul's terminology, actually refers to 
'regional parliaments'. This is because, Gonul refers to 
the creation of units covering more than one province 
(i.e. régionalisation) at the same time with election of 
governors. Gonul sees creation of central administrative 
units covering more than one province possible according 
to acts no. 126 and 127. The idea of election of 
governors is supported by the so-called 'Second Party' of 
the previous president Turgut Ozal's proteges. However,
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as it appeared in the media, they emphasized that this 
would not be a step towards federalism, but strengthening 
local governments. Authority to make laws would remain in 
the Grand National Assembly, and police and justice would 
be excluded from the possible autonomy of local 
governments. Although matters of education and health 
will be dealt by the local governments, the policies on 
these matters would be made by the center.^*
It is believed that the election of prefets will bring 
the present system, which have a long history of central 
government, to a local government base. The proponents of 
the elected prefets states its advantages and 
decentralization as follows: The bureaucratic burden that 
suffocates/restricts the central administration would be 
lightened; participation of people in issues regarding 
their own life and in making of the 'general will' will 
lead to the satisfaction of people and peace in the 
country; democratization will gain speed, and produce its 
fruits; the feeling of common responsibility will 
develop; local government (strengthened through election 
of prefets) is the golden key of creating a contemporary, 
pluralist and participationist civil society, this is
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because local governments are outward looking, and close 
to the individual, open to their participation and 
contribution. Also, Turkey would be able to realize the 
international responsibility that it undertook to 
strengthen the local governments by signing the 'Europe 
Local Government's Autonomy Charter'.^’ Strengthening of 
local governments and weakening of the central authority 
would, it is argued, accelerate urbanization as well.^* 
Finally, there is a general belief in Turkey, which 
considers central government and state concepts as 
synonymous, and which associates the unitary state with 
over-centralized state. But, proponents of local 
government argue that this is an incomplete approach, and 
local governments are actually parts of the state. 
Therefore, although local governments seemingly weaken 
the state, strengthening them will also mean 
strengthening the state as well as civil society.^’
Election of prefets is opposed by different 
commentators,^® but Kırca takes the lead here as well. 
The act 3 in the constitution states the 'indivisible 
integrity of the state with its land and nation'. Kırca 
draws two implications from this.” First, autonomous
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regions with their own executive and/or judiciary cannot 
be created. Second, the administration is unified, a 
point which Gonul would not oppose for he himself 
emphasizes the maintenance of administrative integrity. 
The second implication means not non-election of local 
government organs, but creation of new units will be 
regulated by laws and national government will have the 
right of administrative tutelage. The Prefet (vali), as 
the representative of the center (and the unitary state) 
and the highest authority in the province, uses the 
administrative tutelage right of the center in the 
localities. The prefet, in the present system, takes 
orders from his/her hierarchic supervisors. Kırca opposes 
to election of prefets for he considers it as removing 
the administrative tutelage right of the center, and as 
dismantling the hierarchy. This is because, when the 
prefets get elected their power will spring from the 
electorates, but not from the center. Thus, they would 
not be the representative of the center. Kırca states 
that it is impossible to understand how would a prefet 
not hired and fired by the center would serve the 
government of unitary state. Election of prefets would 
mean that they would not be subject to orders of the
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center, because their power does not spring from the 
center, but from the electorate. According to Kırca, the 
implication of this is bringing the prefets out of the 
central administrative structure and turning the present 
system into a federal government But a federal 
structure is unconstitutional. Kırca sees creation of 
regional level units possible, only if they are to remain 
as administrative units. Thus, they cannot have governors 
(i.e. elected prefets). It is possible to increase the 
powers of prefets' by delegation only, which would mean 
that they would still be subject to orders from the
center.33
In the meantime, a proposal prepared by the coalition 
government at the beginning of 1993 is to became a law 
soon. This proposal named in the media as the 'Super 
Prefet' proposal. The new arrangement will allow prefets 
(as representatives of the center) to use a considerable 
degree of the powers of the center. It seems the proposal 
is based on the principle of delegation rather than 
devolution, and further extension of the center.
The neo-Ottomans include Cengiz Candar (journalist, who
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claims that he has got the patent rights of neo- 
Ottomanism), Engin Ardic (journalist), Fatih Çekirge 
(journalist), and to some extend Zulfi Livaneli (artist) 
and Nur Vergin (sociologist). It should be noted here 
that, although some other journalists do not agree with 
the name, they agree with the idea.^ For some, it is the 
'softened' version of nationalism. Indeed, Candar 
states,
'In reality, we should not be afraid of Pan- 
Turkism, Pan-Islamism. This fear gives us a 
'complex'. Pan-Turkism is the unity of 
Turks, and it is worth pondering on the idea 
of unity of Turks'^*
The Neo-Ottomans are concerned with the international 
context more than the national context. Consequently, 
their alternative restructuring is for the aim of using 
the opportunities emerged with the dismantling of the ex­
soviet Union, ex-Yugoslavia, or more accurately with the 
collapse of communism. The neo-Ottomans argue that the 
present international context allows Turkey to be a 'big 
brother' (read sub-super power) state to the countries 
founded on the Ottoman hinterland. Here, it should be
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noted that they do not talk of removal of political 
borders, but economic borders. Following quotations 
illustrates the perspective of the neo-Ottomans.
'Turkey should do what Ottomans once did, but 
this time through economic rather than 
military conquest
'At the edge of the 21st century a great 
hinterland stretching from Blacksea to China 
is placed behind Turkey. This invites Turkey 
to be a 'big' country.'^**
'Discussing an Ottoman commonwealth or 
federation is more meaningful (than 
discussing presidency (system)
Ardic gives some of the details of his idea which is 
'based on economic cooperation, aiming 
at open and free market unity, built 
upon a loose confederation model -a 
kind of Lebensraum'
Economic cooperation on the Ottoman hinterland is
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considered to be similar to the idea of Turan, and the 
Blacksea Economic Cooperation is considered as a step 
towards realization of the Neo-Ottoman plan/^
But, the present structure of Turkey hinders rather than 
encourages political and economic development of Turkey. 
Therefore, structure of the government should be changed 
to be able to avoid separation, and to be able to make 
the most of its potential. One of the essential 
requirements of this is to be in peace with our past“*^. 
This is because neo-Ottomans believe that the Republic 
was founded upon the basis of rejection of our Ottoman 
past. 'The Republic', Ozkok reports,
'was an 'assertion' regime,this involved 
fighting with everything coming from the 
past, and rejection of the past.
Indeed, this has been done.
What was rejected? Candar gives the answer;
'Turkish Republic was founded upon the basis 
of nation-state, but this in a sense meant 
rejection of the imperial heritage, because a 
lot of Abhaza, Boşnak, Tcherkess, Arnaut
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existed within the country''*'
Therefore, the 'peace' seems to involve a shift from the 
concept of nation-state, and another rejection (of the 
70-year of nation-state). When the nation-state is seen 
as a rejection of the past, differences in the ethnic 
structure is emphasized, sometimes even in an exaggerated 
fashion; Candar argues,
'the Ottoman state of the past and the USA of 
today resembles each other a lot'^®
He, similarly suggests,
'there are breezes in Istanbul from 
New York, and in Turkey from USA (Turkish 
Kurd etc.)
Another version draws similarities not with USA, but with 
the Ottoman state;
'Turkish state is very much like the union of 
kavims in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, in its 
ethnic structure, is the microcosmos of the 
Ottoman Empire. Though, it is a nation- 
state'“**
It was even claimed in an exaggerated fashion that there 
are 47 different ethnicities in Turkey.“*’
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Once it is believed that the nation-state was the 
rejection of the past, and once the ethnic structure of 
Turkey becomes the emphasis, Turkeyism and religion 
emerges as the unifying factors. Religion, for Candar, 
'emerged as a valid value system with the dismantling of 
the socialist block'. It also emerges as the unifying 
factor, as the solution to the Kurdish issue.'® Neo- 
Ottomanism was also suggested as the 
answer to the search for Turkish identity.''
The neo-Ottoman line of argument for decentralization 
takes the issue from a more fundamental point, by 
claiming that the nation-state is a rejection of the 
past. They seem to argue that the integration was/is a 
malintegration. Their emphasis seems to be on Turkey with 
its many different ethnic elements unified, perhaps 
partially, through religion, rather than (created-through 
education) Turk. Thus, the emphasis on Turkeyism follows.
If the unifying factor is not non-ethnical nationalism, 
but religion. Kırca argues, then the unitary nation-state 
will heavily be wounded.” Opponents of neo-Ottomanism
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argue that we have been in peace with our history, and 
such arguments are, in fact, arguments of the enemies of 
the secular state.
At this stage, it is perhaps convenient to consider the 
meaning of secularism in Turkey. The nation-building 
discourse did not consist of an emphasis on religion. 
Secularism can be defined as the separation of religion 
and the state. But such 'shallow' definition might lead 
one to argue that state should not interfere in the field 
of religion. The divisions over the concept of secularism 
in Turkey springs from this point. According to Ozankaya, 
secularism does not mean that the state would not 
interfere in the field of religion.“’' Another line of 
argument is that interference of the state through its 
Religious Affairs Branch (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) 
creates a system in which 'religion is dependent on the 
state'. Therefore, secularizing policies of the center 
are actually meant to be a tight control over the rights 
springing from religious liberty Thus the notion 
state-controlled-religion emerges.
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Secularism means that the religion would not be the 
determinant factor in economical, political, educational, 
and societal matters. In Turkey, it can be suggested 
that, secularization policies aimed at 
'individualization' of Islam. Then, as far as 
decentralization is concerned, the homogeneity in 
understanding the place of Islam is important. This is 
because, decentralization (autonomy) allows 'deviant' 
cases, and could make the religion determinant in local 
affairs. In this context, one might consider 
decentralization as 'dangerous', when s/he bears in mind 
the Konya case in the mid-1980s. The then mayor of Konya 
either provided different busses or divided the busses 
into two sections for men and women. Such policy 
represents a significant deviation from the center's 
policies. It can also reduce the center's confidence in 
the periphery (a determinant of decentralization), and 
may make the center reluctant to decentralize.
When we link the neo-Ottomanism to the proposals of 
régionalisation, neo-Ottoman's alternative restructuring 
seems to have similarities with the traditional Ottoman 
system. Candar argues that Ottoman state was the first
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federal state of the world in an unnamed fashion.'* Given 
the belief that there are similarities between Turkey and 
Ottoman Empire, the traditional Ottoman system can be a 
model. In this picture, center and periphery could be two 
loosely related worlds, but, for them, this would not 
necessarily mean federalism. This is because, in the 
Ottoman system there was a tight control by the center 
and hierarchy, whereas federalism implies a non- 
hierarchical division of authority in the modern sense of 
the word.
It seems the neo-Ottomans are favouring the maintenance 
of the unitary structure of the state, but in a different 
way. They argue for the strength of the executive (for 
the presidency system). They draw parallels between the 
Sultanate and Presidency system, and argue that 
presidency is familiar to us.'^ In their picture we will 
perhaps have an 'Ottoman President''"who will be the 
absolute head of the executive, ruling over the 
regionalised (perhaps on the basis of ethnicity) country. 
Each region would have discretion over its internal 
affairs such as education and health, but not the 
authority to make policies and laws on such issues. It
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seems Neo-Ottomans are arguing for administrative, rather 
than political, decentralization. This is because, their 
arguments seems to favour administrative discretion over 
the policies determined by the center. Thus, delegation 
is the type of decentralization. In an article addressing 
the Kurdish issue, Candar suggests that eyelets governed 
by governors (elected prefets) would solve the problem 
without necessitating a federation.*’ Thus, election of 
governments is not seen as a step forward to fedaralism.
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CONCLUSION
It has been pointed out in the introductory chapter, that 
there are types of decentralization, and not all of them 
implies political decentralization. Three types of 
decentralization are; déconcentration, delegation, and 
devolution.' Déconcentration can be called as 
administrative decentralization, because it is extension 
of center into localities for administrative reasons. 
Delegation is creation of agents that are outside the 
central bureaucratic structure and it involves giving 
some responsibility and authority to these agents, though 
the parameters are defined by the center. The third type, 
devolution, is creation of sub-national units of 
government which are financially and legally more 
powerful regarding the activities that are outside the 
control of central government. Devolution involves a more 
clear-cut division of labour and autonomy in carrying out
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the functions that such division gave. Since the concern 
of this study is political, as opposed to administrative, 
decentralization, the focus is on autonomous authority of 
subnational units from the center. Thus, by political 
decentralization authority to make autonomous decisions 
is understood. It was suggested in the introductory 
chapter that, although it is difficult to make 
distinction between administrative and political 
decentralization, only devolution implies 
decentralization of decision-making authority and 
promotion of alternative power centers.
Once, it is pointed out that the concern of this study is 
political decentralization, the criteria of resource 
capture, solely, is not adequate in assessing political 
decentralization. This is because sub-national units may 
receive adequate amount of resources, but can still act 
as administrative agents of central government without 
any decision-making authority/autonomy. The inadequacy of 
resource capture can be observed from a different angle 
as well. A federal structure means politics at two levels 
and decentralization of political decision making. But, 
when we take the criteria of resource capture.
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ironically, it can be more centralized than a unitary 
state! Therefore, resource dependence can be a better 
measure in assessing political decentralization. If sub­
national units are able to generate their own resources, 
then they are politically more decentralized. This is 
because such ability means they have the legal means to 
generate their own resources, that is to make decisions. 
Resource dependence creates a kind of 'who pays the piper 
calls the tune' situation, and therefore make sub­
national units just administrative agents of the center. 
And such situation can not be changed by providing enough 
resources.
Leaving political culture aside for a while, the level of 
economic wealth, the size of the country, economic 
diversities, and homogeneity of the population in terms 
of language, religion, race are the factors influencing 
decentralization.^ It is said that the more developed a 
country is, the more likeliness of decentralization. This 
is because, a less developed country needs to use its 
limited resources in the most efficient manner which 
necessitates some degree of centralization to gain 
economies of scale. As far as this factor is concerned.
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Turkey, as a developing country, perhaps need some degree 
of centralization.
However, when we take the large size of country into 
account, the picture may change. Generally, large size 
countries tend to be more decentralized for not only it 
is difficult to meet with different needs of different 
areas from one center, but also it is possible to 
generate economies of scale at more than one level. 
Centralization, when the size of the country is large, 
may lead to inefficiencies and delays, hence, some degree 
of resource waste. Therefore, in the case of Turkey, the 
large size of country represents a contrast point to the 
degree of economic development, and provides us with good 
grounds for some degree of decentralization.
Economic diversities may lead to the pressures for more 
autonomy. The Lombardia League of Umberto Bossi in Italy 
illustrates this point. The rich North (almost two times 
more than the south) presses for more autonomy from the 
central government. In the case of Turkey, proposals of 
autonomy for the economic capital, Istanbul, appeared in 
the media. However, the rationale seems to differ from
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the Italian case, where the North does not finance the 
South anymore. In the case of Istanbul, the main reason 
for the grievance seems to be the lack of inadequate 
resources to meet with the needs of the city. It is 
argued that, although Istanbul pays 50% of the total 
income tax, it receives only 5% of it. The only way to be 
able to meet with the needs of the city, it is argued, is 
autonomy and transfer of more resources.^ In the
meantime, it appeared in the media recently that a 
special law on Istanbul is ready. The law allows 
municipalities to receive 80% of the revenues of the 
roads and bridges within the boundaries of Istanbul. But, 
this is, again, an attempt to close the fiscal gap,
rather than political decentralization.
A different kind of pressure for a different kind of 
autonomy comes from the poorer Kurdish areas.
Decentralization in such a case would not be beneficial 
to the poorer areas as far as the distribution 
income/investment concerned. Indeed, the previous 
President suggested the reason why there can not be
federalism with regards to the Kurdish issue: there will 
be no investment made there.'* All these are to suggest 
that economic diversities provides a potential ground for
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future pressures for autonomy. The uneven regional 
development of Turkey increases the likeliness of such 
pressures in the future.
Homogeneity of population in terms of language, religion, 
and race, too, influences the degree of 
(de) centralization. The more heterogeneity is the more 
likeliness of decentralization. In the case of Turkey, 
this correlate is to some extent linked to the nation 
and/or nation-state building. In terms of religion Turkey 
can be considered as homogenous. But, there are different 
understandings of Islam/secularism. Language is not 
completely homogenous since there is a Kurdish-speaking 
community. In addition to existence of Kurdish ethnicity, 
in recent years there had been an increasing emphasis on 
the 'rich* ethnic structure of Turkey. It is on this 
emphasis, as was shown in the second chapter, that some 
of the arguments for decentralization are based. At this 
stage, it is, perhaps, convenient to consider the 
possible implications of political decentralization. As 
noted in the second chapter, decentralization allows 
'deviant* cases. But, it is important how deviant these 
cases will be from the center's policies. Konya-like
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cases seems to represent significant shifts from the 
center's (secular) policies, which, in turn, decreases 
the confidence of the center. Thereby, center may become 
reluctant to decentralize.
Political culture is yet another factor influencing the 
degree of (de) centralization. It seems that in the 
Turkish case political culture is the most important 
factor. The components of political culture are the mode 
of formation of the state, duration, and ideology of 
nation-building. It was political culture that provided 
us with a rationale to review the history of 
(de)centralization in the Ottoman-Turkish polity.
Decentralization can be used for various objectives such 
as nation-building and administrative efficiency. In the 
Ottoman-Turkish case, decentralization was not the means 
used for nation-building. In contrast, the nation­
building efforts involved centralization rather than 
decentralization. The traditional Ottoman Empire had not 
been a centralized state. Centralization of the system 
has actually began with the attempts to forge a nation. 
It was the strong state trying to forge an Ottoman nation
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(later a Turkish nation). Such trial (and centralization 
of the system) began with the Tanzimat reforms. During 
this period, we have seen the extension of center into 
the periphery. The reformers did not have genuine 
decentralizing concerns such as local government. They 
have seen local units as the agents of central 
government, as an extension of central government 
machinery. Therefore, would-be decentralizing measures, 
such as participation of people to local administrations, 
were actually to improve tax collection and for better 
government of provinces by the center's officials.
The centralizing trend continued during, the initially- 
Ottomanist, Committee for Union and Progress period. 
Those prescribing decentralization for the ills of the 
Ottoman State within the Committee eventually had to 
leave. The leader of the decentralizing fraction. Prince 
Sebahattin, left the Committee and found his own League 
of Private Initiation and Decentralization. But, because 
his ideas were not put into practice, Ottoman-Turkish 
polity lacks such experience (and culture?).
Other alternative prescriptions to save the Ottoman state
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were not emphasizing a common Ottoman 
citizenship/territory/state as the unifying elements, but 
the religion or race. Pan-Islamism of Abdulhamit was 
successful only for a while, and the proponents of the 
romantic-natured pan-Turkism soon realized the practical 
problems of the idea.
To sum up, the nation/state building during the Ottoman 
period was not pluralistic in ideology. The source of 
this 'shortcoming'(for decentralization) can be found in 
the unidimensional center-periphery conflict in the 
patrimonial Ottoman Empire, as opposed to multi­
dimensional conflicts in the feudal Europe. Moreover, the 
mode of formation of nation/state building was not 
voluntaristic. The top-to-down social engineering 
continued. It was the state forging a nation. These two 
hindered rather than encouraged political 
decentralization.
Top-to-down social engineering and the unidimensional 
conflict continued in the early years of the Republic. It 
was a kind of decentralizing periphery versus 
centralizing center conflict. The centralized structure
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survived in this period. The only exception was the 1921 
constitution, which gave local governments an 
unprecedented autonomy and role that went beyond the 
Ottoman-Turkish 'local government tradition'. However, 
such local government was not realized. In the early 
years of the Republic, centralization had its own 
'legitimate' reasons, such as to gain economies of scale 
in the absence of adeguate resources. If the concern of 
making the most of the limited resources provided the 
functional reason for decentralization, the concerns over 
ethnic/geographic integration (i.e. nation-state building 
and/or political integration) provided the ideological 
reason. Here, again the initiator-state was forging the 
nation. This period, in this study, was called res 
publica by the military and bureaucratic elites of the 
center. Thus, voluntarism was missing here as well.
The ideological reason for centralization, in turn, can 
be found in the nation concept of the Republic. According 
to this, a nation could be created through education 
(read, homogenization) out of different ethnic and 
religious elements. Therefore it is not surprising to see 
the elites of the res publica considering the periphery
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as disintegrating at the beginning of such 
(homogenization) process. The center's lack of confidence 
in periphery illustrated in the Republican Peoples 
Party's warning to Democratic Party in 1946:
'Do not go to the provincial towns or 
villages to gather support: Our national 
unity will be undermined'*
However, the emphasis of res publica on the state was not 
for good, but it was just an initial emphasis at the 
stage of nation building. On the long run the aim was to 
emphasize society (i.e. transition from transcendentalism 
to instrumentalism). In this study this was called 
transition to democracy (and to local government with it) 
from res publica.* Thus, the res publica was a phase to 
be passed.
Once this is pointed out, it can be said that the 
prospects for local government was depended on the degree 
of homogenization. This is because, center would then 
feel some confidence in the periphery. Thus, the Turkish 
case represents a contrary point in that, in general.
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heterogeneity is considered conducive to 
decentralization. Whereas, in the case of Turkey, 
decentralization was linked to the degree of 
homogenization, but not to the degree of heterogeneity.
Although, some reforms were introduced after 1950s, sub­
national units to-this-day still remain the local 
administrations of the center, but not local governments. 
The military government of early 1980s was not a deviant 
case either: déconcentration was the type of 
decentralization, and the attempt was made to provide 
adequate resources to local administrations. However, it 
was the act 126 in the 1982 constitution which provided 
that 'special administrative arrangements may be made 
into law for large settlements', and on which some of the 
recent debates based. A further 'positive' ground for 
decentralization was provided by the normative ethics 
system of the post-1980 regime which attempted to make 
the sovereign state unnecessary. Thus the emphasis of the 
solidarity shifted to the 'motherland'.^ It can be 
suggested that it was this shift prepared the basis of 
Turkeyism.
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In sum, the 'tradition' of centralization rather than 
decentralization, and the lack of local 'government* 
tradition (but a strong central state) puts Turkey in a 
disadvantaged position as far as political 
decentralization is concerned.
Since Turkey lacks a popular pressure for 
decentralization from the civic community, it can be said 
that the political culture in Turkey is either parochial 
(implies that individuals have low expectations and 
awareness of government and generally not involved) or 
subject (in which individuals are aware of the outcomes 
of government but do not participate in the process that 
result in policy decisio n s ) T h e  lack of civic culture 
can, in turn, be related to the 'papa state' concept in 
the Ottoman-Turkish polity.’
The duration of nation building is, too, a component of 
political culture. It seems that the divisions between 
proponents and opponents of decentralization actually 
represent the divisions over the Turkish concept of 
nation, and there seems to be a division over the 
question of 'if Turkey has completed the process of
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integration or not’ (i.e. duration). Coşkun Kirca, as an 
opponent of decentralization, for example, argues that we 
have not yet consolidated our integration. In reality, 
a complete political integration is not essential before 
decentralization. Indeed, decentralization can be a means 
of political integration. However, in the Turkish case 
pre-condition of decentralization seems to be integration 
first (i.e inheritance of the past).
In addition to this belief that Turkey has not yet 
consolidated its integration in terms of language and 
culture, decentralization is considered to be as a de 
facto step towards federalism. Moreover, because of the 
belief that integration is not completed, 
decentralization is considered to be a threat to the 
'indivisible integrity of the state with its nation and 
land'. Furthermore, the opponents argue that 
decentralization, in such an environment, would wound the 
non-ethnical/non-racial nation state, and shift the basis 
of the state from millet to ummet. Thereby, it is 
believed that the religion will become the unifying 
factor.
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The proponents of decentralization, on the other hand, 
seems to believe either that we have consolidated our 
integration or the already existing way of consolidation 
is 'wrong' (i.e. neo-Ottomans). The proponents in the 
former camp believe that decentralization through 
régionalisation and/or election of prefets would 
strengthen the state. Thus, periphery is not seen as 
disintegrating. Moreover the proponents of 
decentralization associate it with further democracy, 
transparent administration, pluralism, truly local 
governments, and civil society. All these are, of 
course, positive developments. It is also believed that 
decentralization, would result in effectiveness and 
efficiency, urbanization, removal of the bureaucratic 
burden of the center, and participation of people in the 
making of the 'general will'.
The degree of decentralization is influenced by a number 
of factors, such as the level of economic development and 
the size of the country. Although these factors were 
mentioned in this study, the factors of political culture 
and political integration were the main focus. This was 
because, both of these factors were considered to be most
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important factors influencing the degree of 
decentralization in Turkey. The center, in the Ottoman- 
Turkish case, did not have confidence in the periphery, 
and the way of political integration, combined with the 
heritage of the patrimonial past, hindered political 
decentralization. Yet, the aim was to emphasize the 
society on the long run. The suggestion of this study is 
not an unexpected one, though it is a tentative 
suggestion: The prospects for decentralization depends on 
the development of 'civic culture·'®, and the adequate 
degree of homogenization as measured by the center.
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